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Abstract
The standard Bowen model of political competition with single-peaked preferences (Bowen, 1943)
predicts party convergence to the median voter’s ideal policy, with the number of equilibrium
policies not exceeding two. This result assumes majority rule and unidimensional policy space.
We extend this model to static and dynamic political economies where the voting rule is a
supermajority rule, and the policy space is totally ordered. Voters’ strategic behavior is captured
by the core in static environments and by the largest consistent set in dynamic environments.
In these settings, we determine the exact number of equilibria and show that it is an increasing
correspondence of the supermajority’s size. This result has implications for the depth of policy
diversity across structurally identical supermajoritarian political economies. We also examine the
equilibrium effects of supermajority rules on utilitarian welfare and political compromise under
uncertainty.
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1. Introduction
The standard Bowen model of political competition with single-peaked preferences under majority rule (Bowen, 1943; Black, 1948; Downs, 1957) generally predicts party convergence to the
ideal policy supported by the median voter. This fundamental result assumes majority rule and a
unidimensional policy space. We extend this model to a spatial model of political competition between an incumbent policy and an alternative under two different decision-making environments,
one static and the other dynamic. For adoption, the alternative must obtain the support of a
supermajority of voters who, by assumption, hold single-peaked preferences over a totally ordered
policy space. In the static setup, we focus on the set of equilibrium policies in the core (Black,
1948; Gillies, 1959). Equilibrium policies are those which, if already the status quo, are never
defeated in a pairwise supermajoritarian election against alternatives in the policy space.1 In the
dynamic setup, agents make amendments sequentially and the game can go on indefinitely. In
this setting, we focus on the set of equilibrium policies in the largest consistent set (Chwe,
1994). This solution concept assumes farsightedness. To our knowledge, our study is the first to
examine this question in a dynamic setting where agents are farsighted. In both cases, our main
finding is to determine the number of equilibria and show how it depends on the supermajority’s
size. We discuss implications for the depth of policy diversity and divergence across structurally
identical political economies, and develop illustrations to immigration policies, efficiency in the
provision of public goods, and political compromise.
We consider a voting body, N = {1, 2, ..., n}, composed of a finite number of agents and endowed
with a supermajority rule, Lα , and a non-empty totally ordered policy space, Z. The policy space
Z represents the set of possible policies — the number of points or ideological approaches —
to a given policy problem. We assume that Z is totally ordered by a binary relation denoted
≥Z (i.e, ≥Z is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric, and complete), and we denote by >Z the
1
The core, like the Nash equilibrium, is regarded as a pioneer solution concept. In fact, it is the equilibrium
concept used in the pioneering works of Bowen (1943), Black (1948), and Downs (1957), although it is not called
as such in these studies. Note, however, that all our results are highly robust to alternative solution concepts such
as the top cycle (Schwartz, 1976), the uncovered set (Miller, 1980), and the Banks set (Banks, 1985). Proofs are
available upon request.
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strict part of this relation. We assume that agents’ preferences are single-peaked with respect
to the strict order >Z on Z. The supermajority rule Lα is a function which maps each coalition
C ⊆ N into 1 or 0. Given a threshold α ∈ [ 12 , 1], Lα (C) = 1 when either the coalition C consists
of more than αn members if α < 1, or C consists consists of n members if α = 1; we say
such C is a winning coalition, and it holds power to amend a policy under consideration in the
decision-making process. Coalitions for which Lα (C) = 0 are losing coalitions, and they do not
hold the right to amend policies.
Several studies have analyzed different properties of supermajorities rules. Requiring sufficiently
large supermajorities to modify the status-quo may restrict policy change to Pareto improvements
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, Ch. 12) and protect citizens with imperfect information from unrepresentative legislators (Graham and Bernhardt, 2015). Whether supermajority strengthen or
weaken majority holdup against minorities remains unsettled. Buchanan and Tullock (1962, Ch.
7, 12) argues that supermajority rules increase minority bargaining power, affording them protection from a majority seeking to expropriate their resources.2 Writing on the representation
of racial minorities in electoral systems, Guinier (1994, Ch.4) similarly argues that supermajority systems empower minorities and may encourage cross-racial coalition-building. In contrast,
McGinnis and Rappaport (1998) argues that supermajority rules may prevent minorities from
overturning inequitable policies. The added “inertia” from supermajority rules may also lend
stability to electoral systems: Caplin and Nalebuff (1988) illustrate how a 64% majority rule
can prevent electoral cycling, and Barbera and Jackson (2004) demonstrate how using qualified
supermajorities to amend constitutions expands the set of self-stable constitutions for a society
with fixed preferences. In addition to stabilizing policies, supermajority rules may also serve as
commitment devices against dynamic inconsistency problems (Messner and Polborn, 2004, 2012).
Recent literature has considered supermajority rules in designing optimal voting mechanisms to
foster voting incentives, participation, and utilitarian welfare (Krishna and Morgan, 2015; Gershkov et al., 2017; Faravelli and Man, 2021), and in facilitating deliberative democracy following
a structured dialogical design methodology (Laouris and Romm, 2022).
2

Distributive concerns raised by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) are reflected in a large literature evaluating
supermajority rules and the provision of public goods (Tullock, 1959; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; McGinnis and
Rappaport, 1998; Knight, 2000; Lee et al., 2014; Lee, 2015, 2016).
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These articles focus on a particular rationale for supermajority rules, and each of them adopts
a specific framework highlighting the theory of interest. In line with these previous works, we
analyze the connection between supermajoritarian political competition models and the cardinality
of the set of their predicted outcomes.
Precisely, we examine the minimum and the maximum number of equilibrium policies under a
pairwise supermajoritarian election between a status quo policy, z0 , chosen by Nature, a lottery
or an agent, and an alternative policy z1 chosen by an agent from the set Z \ {z0 }. Agents have
equal probabilities of being selected, by Nature or a lottery, to make proposals against the status
quo z0 . If z0 wins, meaning that no winning coalition under Lα chooses z1 over z0 , then it remains
in place and the contest ends. If z0 loses (z1 wins), then z1 replaces z0 and the contest ends. An
equilibrium policy is never defeated in the election process. We find that the minimum number
of equilibrium policies is a constant function of the supermajority’s size. However, the maximum
number of equilibria is an increasing function of the supermajority needed to pass legislation and
is a function of the way the incumbent policy is selected. This number represents the depth of
policy diversity across structurally identical political economies under supermajority rules. More
precisely, Theorem 1 shows that, if Nature randomly selects a legislator to make a proposal, the
maximum number of policies is finite, and it is a non-decreasing function of the supermajority’s
size α.3 It follows that the number of equilibrium policies is a non-decreasing correspondence of
the supermajority’s size needed to pass a policy; see Figure 1. As a byproduct of Theorem 1,
Corollary 1 provides the existence of a unique equilibrium under majority rule (α = 21 ) when there
is an odd number of voters and the existence of, at most, two equilibria when there are an even
number of voters. The familiar Median Voter Theorem (MVT) (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957),
then, is a particular case of our result, which extends it to a more general setting. Although
we generalize the Median Voter Theorem as a particular case of our result, this is not our main
finding. Our main goal is to count the number of equilibria as a function of the supermajority rule
and discuss its empirical implications. Theorem 2 also proves that, if Nature randomly selects the
incumbent policy from the policy space, the set of equilibrium policies becomes a continuum — a
3

The idea of selecting legislators and policymakers by a lottery system, also called “sortition”, is old; it dates
to the fourth century BC and is still practiced today; see, e.g., Manin (1997), Wantchekon and Neeman (2002),
and Procaccia (2019).

3

convex and compact subset of the policy space — and we determine its exact bounds. Theorem
3 shows that these findings are robust, in that they continue to hold when legislators display
farsighted behavior in the dynamic setting.
We also address the question of which rules maximize utilitarian welfare when Nature randomly
selects the status quo policy in the decision-making process. Proposition 1 determines the range
of supermajority size that maximizes the expected utilitarian welfare. This proposition implies
that the majority rule is the unique rule that maximizes expected utilitarian welfare in large
populations.
A practical implication of our analysis is that economies that are identical in terms of their policy
spaces, voters’ preferences, and voting rule may end up diverging in terms of their policy choice;
see, e.g., an illustration on immigration policies in Section 4.1. Theorems 1, 2, and 3 provide
the possibility to quantify the extent of this divergence. In particular, under the majority rule,
no divergence is possible, unless the number of voters is even. Under a (pure) supermajority
rule, policies can diverge, and the policy gap is an increasing function of the supermajority’s size.
Our results can also be used to determine the number of “competing” political parties in a given
election under supermajority rules. Duverger (1963) was among the first scholars to examine the
relationship between electoral systems and party structures in national elections. Duverger focused
primarily on the plurality rule and proportional representation electoral systems under strategic
voting, whereas our focus is on supermajority rules.4 Duverger proposed what are known today
as the Duverger’ law and the Duverger’s hypothesis. The Duverger’s law predicts that two major
parties will form under the plurality rule (Duverger, 1963, p. 217), and the Duverger’s hypothesis states that “the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation
favors multi-partyism” (Duverger, 1963, p. 239). Our analysis transposes Duverger’s ideas to
supermajority rules in static and dynamic models of political competition in legislatures. We
find, in particular, that the majority rule favours a two-party system, which offers an anology to
the prediction of Duverger’s law. However, we find a different prediction under larger majority
4

Generally, strategic voting in single-member districts in national elections refers to a voter deserting a more
preferred candidate with a poor chance of winning a political contest for a less preferred candidate with a better
chance at winning. Although, we do not consider strategic voting in our static framework, we assume that voters
are farsighted in the dynamic setting and they do not necessarily vote sincerely.
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requirement: the maximum equilibrium number of political parties is a non-decreasing function
of the supermajority’s size.5
In addition to policy diversity, we discuss in Section 4.2, the relationship between the range of
equilibrium policies and the social optimal provision of public goods. We find that the social
optimum — the policy that maximizes aggregate utilitarian welfare — is generally unstable under
majority rule. Then, we determine the minimal supermajority rule that guarantees its stability.
An implication of our analysis is that supermajority rules not only lead to policy diversity, but
also protect the social optimum from defeat in a pairwise supermajoritarian competition. In
Section 4.3, we also illustrate our findings with the issue of political compromise. If a political
party prefers an incumbent policy to alternatives, how much should it compromise to ensure
that it does not suffer defeat in a pairwise supermajoritarian competition? Under majority rule,
the MVT suggests convergence toward the median voter’s ideal point. Parties that are more
ideologically distant from the median voter must make greater compromises to avoid defeat. We
extend this insight to any supermajority rule and determine the minimal level of compromise that
a political party should accept to become successful. This level, we find, decreases in the size
of the supermajority needed to replace the incumbent policy. In other words, the greater the
supermajority needed to adopt a new policy, the less the original policy’s proposer or supporters
must compromise to ensure that it is reenacted. An implication that follows directly from this
analysis is that political compromise is maximal under the majority rule. Therefore, our analysis
highlights two new properties of majority rule: it maximizes expected utilitarian welfare when
Nature chooses the status quo policy, and it maximizes political compromise.
By focusing on the number of equilibria in a model of spatial political competition, we clearly
depart from the extant literature that has primarily studied the question of equilibrium existence
(see, e.g., Feldman and Serrano (2006) for a thorough overview of these findings), but has completely overlooked the issue of the number of equilibria. More generally, supermajority rules have
been studied in terms of their equilibrium properties (see, for instance, Fey (2003), Tchantcho
5

We note that several models of voting, including empirical studies, have formalized and tested Duverger’s
arguments and have found mixed results; see, Riker (1982), Palfrey (1989), Feddersen et al. (1990), Cox (1994,
1997), Fey (1997), Myerson (1999), Gallagher and Mitchell (2005), Benoit (2006), Clough (2007), Fujiwara et al.
(2011), and Forand and Maheshri (2015), among others.
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et al. (2010), Peleg (1978), and Freixas and Kurz (2019)) and as basis for generating more
complex voting rules (see, e.g., Taylor and Zwicker (1993), Freixas (2004); Freixas and Puente
(2008), Guemmegne and Pongou (2014), and Kurz et al. (2020)). Our study also contributes
to the literature that uses static and dynamic cooperative game models and their applications
in operational research. For a brief overview of the wealth of knowledge in this growing field of
research, we refer to the studies of Wang and Parlar (1989), Nagarajan and Sošić (2008), Sošić
(2011), Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011), Guajardo and Rönnqvist (2015), Adler et al. (2020), Li
and Chen (2020), and Laouris and Romm (2022). Our analysis departs from these literatures by
focusing on the number of equilibria instead and deriving implications for the depth of policy diversity and political compromise across structurally similar supermajoritarian political economies.
In so doing, we also extend classical results to an environment that is more general.
Although we mainly analyze spatial political games, the issue of the number of equilibria has
also been examined in exchange economies and strategic form games. Starting from the issue
of uniqueness of equilibria in exchange economies, Debreu (1970) highlights the possibility of a
finite number of equilibria in regular exchange economies. This was followed by a treatment of
uniqueness by Dierker and Dierker (1972). Then, Dierker (1972) refines Debreu’s findings by
showing that the number of equilibria is odd. Also, Varian (1975), in a note on Dierker’s study,
provided an alternative proof of Debreu (1970). Along the same lines, Nishimura (1978) shows
that the previous results are independent of the assumption of preference monotonicity used by
Debreu (1970) and Dierker (1972), and offers an insight which makes the findings more applicable
to economics, international trade theory, and stability theory.
In strategic form games, one primary concern dates back to the works of Wilson (1971a) and
Harsanyi (1973) on the computation of Nash equilibria in N -person games. Wilson (1971a,
Theorem 1, p. 85) demonstrates that, apart from certain degenerate cases, in any game with
finite pure strategies, the number of mixed strategy Nash equilibria is positive and odd. Harsanyi
provides an alternative proof for Wilson’s result, and proves that in “almost all” games with finite
pure strategies, the number of mixed strategy Nash equilibria is finite and odd. We note, however,
that except the case of a unique equilibrium solution, the previous studies do not provide a formal
expression of the number of equilibria in a game. Studies that provide formulas for the number
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of equilibria (or at least for the lower and upper bounds), as we do in this study, include, among
others, McLennan (1997) who determines the maximal generic number of pure (and mixed)
strategies Nash equilibria, Von Stengel (1999) who determines a lower bound of

d
2.414
√
d

for the

maximal number of Nash equilibria in d × d bimatrix games, McLennan (2005) who characterizes
the mean (or expected) number of pure (and mixed) strategy Nash equilibria in random strategic
form games6 , and Deutsch et al. (2011) who provide explicit and computable expressions for all
possible Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game. Closely related to the previous literature
are efforts to develop algorithms to facilitate the search for Nash equilibria in a strategic form
game.7
Our contributions also complement the seminal study by Caplin and Nalebuff (1988) and the
studies inspired by their work (see, e.g., Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), Levin and Nalebuff (1995),
and Barbera and Jackson (2004)), and Kline (2014), but they do not address the questions
we examine in our study. Caplin and Nalebuff formalize the conjectures made by Condorcet
(1785) and Arrow (1951) in “static” electoral systems, showing that voting cycles are impossible
under the 64%-majority rule.8 Kline studies the effects of the status quo on the existence of
the core, and the Banks set (Banks, 1985). Kline provides conditions under which the location
of the status quo alternative determines the intersection between the Banks set and the core in
supermajoritarian spatial voting games. Our dynamic approach is inspired by Chwe’s study and
the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994). Moreover, Kline (2014) studies sophisticated agenda
settings. Our framework includes both a static and dynamic approach, and we focus on counting
the number of equilibria and their implications for policy-making in democratic institutions. In
6

In an n-agent model of random game, the agents’ payoffs are statistically independent, with each agent’s
payoff uniformly distributed on the unit sphere in RS , where S = S1 × ... × Sn , Si a finite pure strategy set,
i = 1, ..., n.
7
We can cite, among many others, Echenique (2007) who provides a simple and fast algorithm that finds all
the pure strategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities (these models have several applications
in operational research; see, e.g., Lippman and McCardle (1997), Cachon (2001), and Bernstein and Federgruen
(2004)), Dı́az-Báñez et al. (2011) who propose an algorithm to find all possible pure strategy Nash equilibria in
a planar location-price game, and recently Deutsch (2021) who develops a linear-time algorithm to compute all
Nash equilibria solutions for a general two-person nonzero-sum simultaneous inspection game.
8
For a review of other studies on voting in social choice theory and additional details on electoral systems,
we refer to the works of Nurmi (1986), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Brams and Fishburn (2002), Arrow et al.
(2010), Freixas et al. (2014), Polyakovskiy et al. (2016), Menezes et al. (2016), Tideman (2017), Burka et al.
(2022), and the references therein.
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that respect, we think that our contribution is original.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminary concepts. Section 3 examines the
number and range of equilibrium policies under static and dynamic political settings. It also studies
the welfare implications of supermajority rules. Section 4 applies our results to explain policy
diversity across identical political economies, provision of public goods, and political compromise.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Preliminary Concepts
We model a political economy as a list P ≡ P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ), where: (a) N =
{1, 2, ..., n} is a voting body, composed of a finite number of agents (we assume that n is at
least 2); (b) Z is a non-empty policy space, which is totally ordered by a binary relation ≥Z
that is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric, and complete (we denote by >Z the strict part of
the binary relation ≥Z ); (c) ⪰i denotes agent i’s preference relation over Z and (⪰i ) denotes
a preference profile over Z; and (d) Lα is a supermajority rule (or qualified majority) of size α
(α ∈ [ 21 , 1]). A supermajority rule is a distribution of political decision-making power among the
various coalitions of agents eligible to vote (for simplicity, we assume that each agent can vote).
The aggregate function Lα is a family of voting rules that includes from simple majority rule
(α = 12 ) up to unanimity (α = 1).
For any policies x, y ∈ Z, the intervals [x, y] (and ]x, y[) are subsets of Z defined as: [x, y] =
{z ∈ Z : y ≥Z z ≥Z x} (and ]x, y[= {z ∈ Z : y >Z z >Z x}), respectively. For a given
finite and non-empty set X, we denote by |X|, the cardinality of X (i.e., the number of elements
contained in X), and n the cardinality of N . For x, y ∈ Z, y ⪰i x indicates that agent i weakly
prefers y to x; y ≻i x indicates that agent i prefers y to x; and y ∼i x indicates that agent i is
indifferent between y and x. Moreover, for S ⊆ N , y ≻S x indicates that y ≻i x for each i ∈ S
(we say S prefers y over x); and y ⪰S x indicates that y ≻i x for some i ∈ S and y ∼j x for
other j ∈ S (we say S weakly prefers y over x).
Following the classical literature on spatial competition (see, e.g., Bowen (1943) and Black
(1948)), we assume that the profile (⪰i ) is single-peaked with respect to the strict order >Z
on Z. It means that each agent has an ideal policy in the policy space Z, and policies that are
8

further from this ideal policy are preferred less. Formally, for each agent i ∈ N , there exists a
policy zip ∈ Z such that: (1) for any other policy z ̸= zip , zip ≻i z; and (2) for any policy z, z ′ , if
z >Z z ′ >Z zip , then z ′ ≻i z, and, if zip >Z z >Z z ′ , then z ≻i z ′ .
3. Number and Range of Equilibrium Policies
In this section, we examine the existence and the maximum number of equilibrium policies under
one-shot political games (Section 3.1) and dynamic political games (Section 3.2).9 To perform
the analysis in one-shot games, we distinguish two cases: (i) an agent is randomly chosen to make
a proposal (Section 3.1.1); or (ii) the status quo policy is chosen by Nature (Section 3.1.2). We
assume that agents have equal probabilities of being selected, by Nature or a lottery as an agenda
setter. Controlling for temporal factors that affect agents’ preferences and status-quo policies,
what is the relationship between a legislative body’s voting rule and policy stability? Section 3
answers this question.
3.1. One-shot Political Games
Political contests occur as follows:
1. At time t = 0, a policy z0 is randomly chosen by Nature, a lottery, or an agent from the
policy space Z.
2. At time t = 1, a contest is organized between z0 (the status quo) and an alternative z1 ,
chosen exogenously by an agent from the set Z \ {z0 }.
a) If z0 wins, meaning that no winning coalition under Lα chooses z1 over z0 , then it
remains in place and the contest ends.
b) If z0 loses (z1 wins), then z1 replaces z0 and the contest ends.
The rational behavior in the one-shot political game above is straightforward. Each agent chooses
between the status quo policy and a political alternative. The incentive driving agents to vote
for an opposition policy is the condition that it is preferable to the status quo. Formalizing this
9

The domain of political games that we study is a subclass of games defined by effectivity functions (see,
e.g., Wilson (1971b), Moulin and Peleg (1982), Peleg (1984), Chwe (1994), and Fotso et al. (2017) who provide
a brief survey of such games).
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behavior, let ≫i denote the incentive by which agent i decides to support an opposition policy
z1 over the status quo z0 . If agent i prefers z1 over z0 (i.e., z1 ≻i z0 ), agent i will vote for z1
over z0 , denoted as z1 ≫i z0 . The policy z1 wins the pairwise supermajoritarian election if there
exists a winning coalition C that supports z1 over z0 (z1 ≫C z0 ). We can now introduce the
equilibrium set, defined as follows.10
Definition 1 Let P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) be a political economy and C be a winning coalition.
1. z ′ defeats z (or z ′ ≫ z) thanks to C (i.e., z ′ ≫C z) if C prefers z ′ over z (i.e, z ′ ≻C z).
2. z is defeated if there exists a policy z ′ and a winning coalition C ′ such that z ′ defeats z
thanks to C ′ .
3. The core or equilibrium set E(P(α)) consists of all undefeated policies.

2

An equilibrium policy is one that, if chosen as the status quo, could not be defeated or replaced
by another policy. In a pairwise contest between two policies, say z and z ′ , the former receives
votes from agents whose ideal points are closer to z than z ′ , and vice versa. Each agent’s payoff
depends on the distance between her ideal policy and the winning policy.
3.1.1. Nature Randomly Selects a Proposer
At time t = 0, an agent is randomly selected, by Nature or a lottery, to make a proposal. Agents
are identical with equal probabilities of being selected. The proposer chooses the status quo.
Given single-peakedness and rational behavior, each agent’s best choice is to propose the closest
equilibrium policy ideal to their ideal point as the status quo.11 Theorem 1 demonstrates the
existence of a policy that cannot be defeated in a pairwise supermajoritarian election and provides
the maximum number of policies that can be implemented. Before enunciating the result, we
introduce the following notation: for any real number x, the value f loor[x], and labelled as ⌊x⌋,
is the largest integer less than or equal to x.
10

For a brief review on formalizing and testing rationality concepts in static and dynamic voting games, including
effectivity functions, we refer to the studies of Fotso et al. (2017) and the references therein.
11
One can trace a similar argument from the work of Downs (1957) and the seminal essay of Riker (1982) and
the references therein. Even if we assume that the proposer is not rational and he or she proposes his or her ideal
point as the status quo, our findings do not change. Throughout the paper, we assume that agents are rational
in their decisions.
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Theorem 1 Let P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) be a political economy. Assume that agents are chosen
randomly with equal probabilities to make a proposal. If agents have single-peaked preferences
over Z, then there exists at least one equilibrium and the number of equilibria is finite. Formally:
1 ≤ |E(P(α))| ≤ min{2⌊αn⌋ + 2 − n, n}.
The maximum number of equilibria in P(α) is n when α = 1, and 2⌊αn⌋+2−n when α ∈ [ 21 , 1).2
Let z ∈ Z be a policy and define S(z) as the number of agents for whom z is the peak. A
coalition of agents S has a veto right to amend a given status quo if S is a winning coalition,
i.e., |S| > αn. Consider the functions f and g defined on the policy space Z as follows: for any
policy z ′ ∈ Z,

X

f (z ′ ) =

S(z) − αn, and g(z ′ ) =

X

S(z) − αn.

z ′ ≥Z z

z≥Z z ′

We define the following sets:
Zf = {z ′ ∈ Z : f (z ′ ) > 0} , and Zg = {z ′ ∈ Z : g(z ′ ) > 0} .

To prove Theorem 1, the following lemmas proved useful.
Lemma 1 Let P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) be a political economy, with α ∈ [0, 1). There exist two
peaks z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α) such that: z1∗ (α) minimizes f over Zf , and z2∗ (α) minimizes g over Zg .2
Proof (Lemma 1) Notice that neither Zf , nor Zg is empty. In fact, given that zmin and zmax
are respectively the smallest and the greatest peaks of Z, then f (zmin ) = n − αn = (1 − α)n > 0
and g(zmax ) = n−αn = (1−α)n > 0, since α < 1, which implies that zmin ∈ Zf and zmax ∈ Zg ,
in turn implying that Zf ̸= ∅ and Zg ̸= ∅. Given that Zf is finite and f is a strictly decreasing
function, there exists a unique peak z1∗ (α) which minimizes f over Zf . In addition, for any peak
P
z ′ >Z z1∗ (α), f (z ′ ) ≤ 0, which implies that
S(z) ≤ αn. Similarly, given that Zg is finite
z≥Z z ′

and g is a strictly increasing function, there exists a unique peak z2∗ (α) which minimizes g over
P
Zg . In addition, for any peak z2∗ (α) >Z z ′ , g(z ′ ) ≤ 0, which implies that
S(z) ≤ αn.
■
z ′ ≥Z z
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Lemma 2 Assume that z1∗ (α) = z2∗ (α) = z ∗ (α). Then, E(P(α)) = {z ∗ (α)}.

2

Proof (Lemma 2) We claim that z ∗ (α) is the Condorcet winner. Indeed, let z ∈ Z be a peak.
P
P
If z ∗ (α) >Z z, by definition of z ∗ (α),
S(z ′ ) ≤ αn and
S(z ′ ) > αn, which implies
z≥Z z ′

z ′ ≥Z z ∗ (α)

∗

that z (α) defeats z in a pairwise supermajoritarian election. Similarly, if z >Z z ∗ (α), we show
in the same way that z ∗ (α) defeats z. It follows that z ∗ (α) defeats any other peak z. Since there
is no other option which defeats z ∗ (α), then E(P(α)) = {z ∗ (α)}.

■

Lemma 3 If z1∗ (α) ̸= z2∗ (α), then z2∗ (α) >Z z1∗ (α).

2

Proof (Lemma 3) Assume by contradiction that z1∗ (α) >Z z2∗ (α). By definition of z1∗ (α) and
P
P
P
z2∗ (α), we have
S(z) > αn and
S(z) > αn, then
S(z) > 2αn. Given that
z∈Z
z≥Z z1∗ (α)
z2∗ (α)≥Z z
P
S(z) = n, it follows that n > 2αn, meaning that α < 21 , a contradiction, since by assumption
z∈Z
1
≤
2

α < 1. Hence, the only remaining possibility is z2∗ (α) >Z z1∗ (α).

Lemma 4 There exists z ∗ ∈]z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)[, with S(z ∗ ) ̸= 0.

■

2

Proof (Lemma 4) Assume the contrary. By the definition of policies z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α), we have
P
P
P
P
S(z) > αn and
S(z) > αn. These imply that
S(z) +
S(z) >
z≥Z z1∗ (α)
z2∗ (α)≥Z z
z≥Z z1∗ (α)
z2∗ (α)≥Z z
P
2αn or
S(z) > 2αn leading to α < 21 , which is a contradiction. It follows that there exists
z∈Z

a policy z ∗ ∈]z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)[, such that S(z ∗ ) ̸= 0. Note that, in this case, z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α) are
P
P
such that
S(z) < αn, and
S(z) < αn.
■
z1∗ (α)≥Z z

z≥Z z2∗ (α)

Lemma 5 If z ∈ Z \ [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)], then z ∈
/ E(P(α)).

2

Proof (Lemma 5) Consider z ∈ Z distinct to z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α). Assume that z is the closest
peak to the left of z1∗ (α). In a pairwise supermajoritarian opposition between z and z1∗ (α), the forP
P
mer receives at most
S(z ′ ) number of votes, while the latter receives at most
S(z ′ ).
z≥Z z ′
z ′ ≥Z z1∗ (α)
P
P
P
′
′
∗
′
S(z ) ≤
S(z ) < αn, and
S(z ) > αn, then, z1 (α) wins. We can
Since,
z1∗ (α)≥Z z ′

z≥Z z ′

also show that

z2∗ (α)

defeats any peak z, with

z ′ ≥Z z1∗ (α)
z >Z z2∗ (α).

Lemma 6 If z ∈ [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)], then z ∈ E(P(α)).
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■

2

Proof (Lemma 6) Consider a peak z ∈

[z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)]. Assume that there exists z ′ ∈

]z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)[ such that z ′ defeats z. Without loss of generality, assume that z ′ is the closP
est peak to z with z >Z z ′ . Policy z ′ defeats z implies that
S(x) > αn, which is a
z ′ ≥Z x
P
contradiction, because by definition of z2∗ (α), z2∗ (α) >Z z ′ implies that
S(x) ≤ αn. Thus,
z ′ ≥Z x

E(P(α)) = [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)].

■

Now, we prove Theorem 1.
Proof (Theorem 1) First, if α = 1, then the only winning coalition is the set N . Given that
individuals make proposals against the status quo z0 , then each peak is a predicted outcome of
the game. In fact, the maximum number of votes that an alternative policy z1 (distinct than z0 )
in a pairwise supermajoritarian opposition can receive is n − 1. If the supermajority rule requires
n votes to win, then no alternative can be defeated, and the maximum number of predicted
outcomes is the cardinality of N , i.e., n. Second, if n is odd, and α =

1
,
2

then the median

peak is the unique prediction of the pairwise supermajoritarian game, because it is the Condorcet
winner, i.e., it defeats any other policy in a pairwise supermajoritarian opposition. Third, from
Lemmas 2, 5, and 6, we show that any alternative which is not part of the interval bounded by
the peaks z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α) can be directly defeated by either z1∗ (α) or z2∗ (α), and any peak in
this interval cannot be defeated. Therefore, the maximal number of equilibria is equal to the
number of agents who have a peak between z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α). Given that the proportion of
agents required to form a winning coalition is at least
is n − 2(1 −

⌊αn⌋+1
)n
n

= 2⌊αn⌋ + 2 − n < n.

⌊αn⌋+1
,
n

then the upper bound of E(P(α))
■

As shown in Figure 1, the minimum number of equilibrium policies is 1 regardless of the supermajority rule. The maximum number of equilibrium policies is a non-decreasing function of the
supermajority needed to replace them. It follows that, for a fixed size n of voters, the number of
equilibrium policies is a non-decreasing correspondence of the supermajority’s size α. A corollary
of Theorem 1 is the following result, which derives the size of the equilibrium set under the
majority rule and thus clarifies the way Theorem 1 extends the MVT when the number of agents
is even.
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Corollary 1 Let P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) be a political economy. Assume that agents are
chosen randomly with equal probabilities to make a proposal. If preferences are single-peaked,
and policies are chosen using the majority rule (α = 12 ), then,
1. There is only one equilibrium if the size of voters is odd.
2. There exists at least one and at most two equilibria if the size of voters is even.

2

Proof (Corollary 1) From Theorem 1, if α = 21 , then the size of equilibrium set E(P( 21 ))
depends on the size of n. If n is odd, the number ⌊αn⌋ =

n−1
,
2

therefore 2⌊αn⌋ + 2 − n =

n − 1 + 2 − n = 1, meaning that a unique equilibrium exists. It is, in fact, the ideal policy of the
median voter. If n is even, there exist at most two equilibria since the number ⌊αn⌋ =
2⌊αn⌋ + 2 − n = n + 2 − n = 2.

n
2

and
■

max |Ε(Ρ(α))| = 2 floor[100 α]-98
min |Ε(Ρ(α))| = 1

Number of Equilibria |Ε(Ρ(α))|
100
80
60
40
20
0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

Supermajority α

Figure 1: Number of equilibria (|E(P(α))|) and the size of supermajority rule (α) in a voting body of 100
agents. Note: For each value of α ∈ [0.5, 1), the cornflower curve represents the maximum number of equilibria: max |E(P(α))| = 2⌊100α⌋ − 98, and the orange curve represents the minimum number of equilibria:
min |E(P(α))| = 1.

3.1.2. Nature Randomly Chooses a Status Quo
Next, suppose that Nature, rather than choosing the proposer in t = 0, instead chooses the
status quo z0 ∈ Z from the set of all policies. Theorem 2 proves the existence of at least one
and possibly an infinite number of equilibrium policies.
14

Theorem 2 Let P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) be a political economy and assume that Nature randomly chooses the status quo. Let z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α) denote, respectively, the minimal and the
maximal equilibria when Nature randomly selects a proposer. Then, E(P(α)) = [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)].2
Proof (Theorem 2) The proof is deduced from the proof of Theorem 1. The status quo,
chosen randomly by Nature, can take any position in spatial space Z. From Theorem 1, any
position between and including z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α), is invulnerable to pairwise supermajoritarian
opposition. In this case, the interval bounded by the peaks z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α) is the equilibrium
set, E(P(α)).

■

Under the majority rule, the equilibrium set described in Theorem 2 exhibits an interesting property. When the number of voters is odd and α =

1
,
2

p
, and the set
z1∗ (α) = z2∗ (α) = zm

p
p
[z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)] is the singleton {zm
}, where zm
is the ideal point of the median voter. If the

number of voters is even, however, the set of equilibria may be infinite. In this sense, Theorem
2 offers a more complete statement of the MVT compared to Black (1948). Our findings in
Theorems 1 and 2 reveal the existence and the number of equilibria in a static spatial political
competition. An equivalent definition of the existence of an equilibrium in our framework is the
absence of voting cycles. As mentioned in the Introduction, several studies have focused on the
existence of equilibria and the possibility of voting cycles. An earlier study by Schofield et al.
(1988) surveyed important lines of research investigating core existence in spatial voting games.
Another appropriate tool in the domain of simple games without vetoers (voters who belong to
all winning coalitions) is the so-called Nakamura number (Nakamura, 1979).12 A recent study by
Freixas and Kurz (2019) and the references therein offer an excellent survey of the applications of
the Nakamura number in voting contexts and related problems, including cutting stock problems
in operational research.13 As we do in this paper, these previous studies offer optimistic results
on the absence of cycles and the stability of group choice in political competition models.
12

A simple game is a mapping from the set of coalitions into {0, 1}, where “1” means the coalition is a winning
coalition and “0” means the coalition is not a winning coalition. The Nakamura number of a simple game is the
smallest number k such that there exist k winning coalitions with empty intersection.
13
See, e.g., Gilmore and Gomory (1961) and Scheithauer and Terno (1995).

15

3.2. Dynamic Political Games
In dynamic political games, contrary to one-shot games, agents (or coalitions) may vote indefinitely. Assume that, a status quo z0 is randomly chosen from the set of policies. If no winning
coalition replaces z0 , then it remains in place on an indefinite basis and the political opposition
ends. If a winning coalition S replaces z0 , say with z1 , then z1 becomes the new status quo, and
the process restarts, continuing until a policy has been reached to which no winning coalition
is willing to object. Once that policy has been reached, each agent earns and consumes his or
her payoff and the political contest ends. We illustrate the predictions of such a game with the
largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994), one of the prominent equilibrium concepts in infinite-horizon
political games.14
Chwe (1994) defines the largest consistent set, an equilibrium concept for social environments
where agents, acting in public, can freely form coalitions without binding agreements and are
farsighted. Chwe assumes that agent i holds a strict preference relation ≻i over Z, and coalitions
of agents may be endowed with the power to replace one policy by some other policies. If a
coalition S ⊆ N has the right to replace z ∈ Z by some z ′ ∈ Z, we write z −→S z ′ . Following
Chwe’s notations, a social environment is represented by a list (N, Z, {≻i }i∈N , {−→S }S⊂N,S̸=∅ ).
To capture the idea of farsightedness, Chwe formalizes the notion of indirect dominance that
was formally discussed by Harsanyi (1974) in his criticism of the von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944)’s solution concept which is based on direct dominance. For z, z ′ ∈ Z, z ′ is said to indirectly
dominate z, or z ′ ⋗ z, if there exists a sequence of policies z0 , z1 , ..., zm ∈ Z (where z0 =
z and zm = z ′ ) and a sequence of winning coalitions S0 , S1 , ..., Sm−1 such that zi −→Si zi+1
and z ′ ≻Si zi for i = 0, 1, ..., m−1. The case m = 1 yields the definition of the direct dominance.
Chwe (1994, Proposition 2, P. 305) shows that the largest consistent set is non-empty if Z is finite
or countably infinite, and there are no ⋗-chains, i.e., an infinite sequences of policies z1 , z2 , z3 ,...
such that i < j =⇒ zj ⋗ zi . Xue (1997, Theorem, p. 455) extends Chwe (1994, Proposition 2,
p. 305)’s non-emptiness result of the largest consistent set by removing the countability and by
weakening the condition that there is no ⋗-chains. As discussed by Xue (1997, p. 453), such an
14

For a brief review on other solution concepts in dynamic farsighted coalitional games, we refer to the studies
of Nagarajan and Sošić (2008), Sošić (2011), Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011), Fotso et al. (2017), and Li and Chen
(2020).
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extension allows one to apply the largest consistent set to models with continuum of alternatives.
Note however, that both Chwe (1994, Proposition 2, p. 305) and Xue (1997, p. 453) assume
that agents have strict preferences over the policy space Z, a different assumption that we make
in this paper.
In this section, we examine Chwe (1994, Proposition 2, p. 305)’s non-emptiness result of the
largest consistent set when the distribution of veto rights among coalitions is given by a supermajority rule, the policy space Z is totally ordered, and agents have single-peaked preferences
over Z. For z, z ′ ∈ Z, z −→S z ′ if and only if S is a winning coalition (i.e., |S| > αn). Therefore, a social environment (N, Z, {≻i }i∈N , {−→S }S⊂N,S̸=∅ ) is equivalent to a political economy
P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ), where Lα replaces {−→S }S⊂N,S̸=∅ . We recall the definition of the
largest consistent set below.
Definition 2 Let P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) be a political economy, and X be a subset of Z.
1. X is said to be consistent if x ∈ X if and only if ∀y ∈ Z and S ⊂ N such that x −→S y,
there exists z ∈ X, where y = z or z ⋗ y, and not(x ≻S z).
2. The largest consistent set of the political economy P(α), denoted LCS(P(α)), is the
union of all the consistent sets.

2

The largest consistent set formalizes the notion that a coalition that moves from a status quo
to an alternative policy anticipates the possibility that another coalition might react. A third
coalition might in turn react, and so on, without limit. It is therefore important to act in a way
that does not lead a coalition to ultimately regret its action, i.e., coalitions are “fully farsighted”
(Chwe, 1994, p. 300). In Theorem 3, we show that the largest consistent set is non-empty, and
we derive the maximum number of equilibria in the largest consistent set when Nature randomly
chooses agents with equal probabilities to propose a status quo.
Theorem 3 Let P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) be a political economy.
A. Assume that Nature randomly proposes the status quo. Then, LCS(P(α)) = [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)].
B. Assume that Nature randomly chooses agents with equal probabilities to propose a status
quo. Then, 1 ≤ |LCS(P(α))| ≤ min{2⌊αn⌋ + 2 − n, n}. Thus, the maximum number of
17

equilibria in P is n when α = 1, and 2⌊αn⌋ + 2 − n when α ∈ [ 21 , 1).

2

Proof (Theorem 3) Let P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) be a political economy.
1. Let z ∈ Z. If z1∗ (α) >Z z, then z1∗ (α) indirectly dominates z; If z >Z z2∗ (α), then z2∗ (α)
indirectly dominates z. The only alternatives that are not indirectly dominated belong to
the interval [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)]. A subset X ⊆ Z is consistent if

f (X) =



x ∈ Z : ∀y ∈ Z, ∀S, x −→S y, ∃z ∈ X, where
y = z or z ⋗ y and not(x ≻ z)
S

= X.



For each agent i ∈ N , we denote by zip their ideal policy. By definition of z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α),
the sets S = {i ∈ N : zip ≥Z z1∗ (α)} and T = {i ∈ N : z2∗ (α) ≥Z zip } are winning
coalitions. Let z ∈ Z be a proposal: (a) if z1∗ (α) >Z z, then any deviation from z by
any winning coalition to z1∗ (α) is not deterred. Similarly; (b) if z >Z z2∗ (α), then any
deviation from z by any winning coalition to z2∗ (α) is not deterred. Hence, in these two
cases, z ∈
/ f (Z). However, if z ∈ [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)], any deviation from z is deterred. Indeed,
without loss of generality, assume x = z1∗ (α), and consider y ∈ Z and a winning coalition
S ′ , such that x −→S ′ y. (c) If z1∗ (α) >Z y, then there exists z = z1∗ (α), with z1∗ (α) ⋗ y
via T , and not(z1∗ (α) ≻S z1∗ (α)); (d) If y ∈]z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)[, then, there exists z = y, such
that not(z ≻S ′ z1∗ (α)), with |S ′ | > αn, because z2∗ (α) >Z y; (e) If y >Z z2∗ (α), then,
there exists z = z2∗ (α), with z2∗ (α) ⋗ y via S, and not(z2∗ (α) ≻S ′ z1∗ (α)), with |S ′ | > αn.
It follows that f (Z) = [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)]. It is straightforward to check that f (f (Z)) = f (Z);
therefore f (Z) is the largest consistent set, and item A. of Theorem 3 is proved.
2. First, if α = 1, then the only winning coalition is the set N . Given that agents propose
the status quo z0 , the cardinality of the largest coalition than can propose an alternative
policy z1 against z0 is n − 1. If the supermajority rule requires n agents to replace the
status quo, then no alternative can be indirectly dominated, and the maximum number of
predicted outcomes is the cardinality of N , i.e., n. Second, if n is odd, and α = 21 , then
the median peak is the unique prediction of the largest consistent set, because it is the
Condorcet winner, i.e., it indirectly dominated any other policy in the game. Third, from
18

point 1., we show that LCS(P(α)) = [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)]. Therefore, the maximal number of
equilibria is the number of agents who have a peak between z1∗ (α) and z2∗ (α). Given that
the proportion of agents required to form a winning coalition is at least
upper bound of LCS(P(α)) is n − 2(1 −

⌊αn⌋+1
)n
n

⌊αn⌋+1
,
n

then the

= 2⌊αn⌋ + 2 − n < n. The latter

concludes the proof of item B. of Theorem 3.

■

3.3. Utilitarian Social Planner
In previous sections, we derive the bounds of the equilibrium set as a function of the decision
rule used to aggregate agents’ preferences and voting decisions in static and dynamic political
competitions. In this section, we address the question of which decision rule maximizes social
welfare.
Let us consider a political P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ), and assume that Nature randomly chooses
the status quo policy in the voting procedure. Then, from Theorems 2 and 3, the equilibrium
set is E(P(α)) = [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)]. One might ask how policy diversity, which is explained by
the multiplicity of equilibria as the supermajority size α increases, affects social welfare from a
utilitarian perspective. To examine this question, we assume that Z ⊂ R, and each agent i’s
preference ⪰i over Z can be represented by a strictly quasi-concave utility function, Vi . We
take an ex-ante perspective and examine the behavior of a utilitarian planner who chooses a
supermajority rule Lα to maximize expected utilitarian welfare given by:
Z
W (α) =

p(z)W (z)dz,
z∈E(P(α))

where W is the usual social welfare function given by the sum of voters’ utilities and defined as:
P
W (z) :=
Vi (z), for z ∈ Z. For simplicity, we assume that n is odd. Under the supermajority
i∈N
p
p
p
threshold α ∈ [ 21 , n+1
], it holds that z1∗ (α) = z2∗ (α) = zm
and E(P(α)) = {zm
}, where zm
2n
p
is the peak of the median voter, and W (α) = W (zm
). For any supermajority rule α, with

α >

n+1
,
2n

p
it is generally the case that z1∗ (α) ̸= z2∗ (α) ̸= zm
, and p(z) =

1
z2∗ (α)−z1∗ (α)

for each

z ∈ E(P(α)), because policies in E(P(α)) have the same chance to be chosen by Nature.
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Therefore, W (α) =

1
z2∗ (α)−z1∗ (α)

W (α) =

R z2∗ (α)
z1∗ (α)

W (z)dz. In summary,



p
W (zm
)



if α ∈ [ 21 , n+1
]
2n

1
z2∗ (α)−z1∗ (α)

R z2∗ (α)
z1∗ (α)

if α ∈

W (z)dz

.

(1)

( n+1
, 1]
2n

Assuming that all other elements in P(α) remain the same except the supermajority rule Lα ,
which threshold α maximize W (α)? Proposition 1 below answers this question.15
]. It follows
Proposition 1 The expected utilitarian welfare W (α) is maximal for any α ∈ [ 21 , n+1
2n
that for a sufficiently large population, the majority rule is the unique rule that maximizes expected
utilitarian welfare.

2

Proof (Proposition 1) Let ϵ be a small and positive number. The equilibrium set of the
political economy P(α + ϵ) is E(P(α + ϵ)) = [z1∗ (α + ϵ), z2∗ (α + ϵ)], which contains the set
E(P(α)) = [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)] because z2∗ (α + ϵ) ≥ z2∗ (α) ≥ z1∗ (α) ≥ z1∗ (α + ϵ). Then, we can write
W (α + ϵ) as
Z

1
W (α + ϵ) = ∗
z2 (α + ϵ) − z1∗ (α + ϵ)

W (z)dz
z1∗ (α+ϵ)

Z

1
= ∗
z2 (α + ϵ) − z1∗ (α + ϵ)
Given that

1
z2∗ (α)−z1∗ (α)

>

z2∗ (α+ϵ)

Z

z2∗ (α)

Z

!

z2∗ (α+ϵ)

Z

W (z)dz

W (z)dz +

W (z)dz +

z2∗ (α)

z1∗ (α)

z1∗ (α+ϵ)

1
,
z2∗ (α+ϵ)−z1∗ (α)+ϵ

1
W (α + ϵ) < ∗
z2 (α) − z1∗ (α)

z1∗ (α)

it follows that

z1∗ (α)

Z

z2∗ (α)

W (z)dz +
z1∗ (α+ϵ)

Z
W (z)dz +

z1∗ (α)

!

z2∗ (α+ϵ)

W (z)dz
z2∗ (α)

or
1
W (α + ϵ) − W (α) < ∗
z2 (α) − z1∗ (α)
15

Z

z1∗ (α)

1
W (z)dz + ∗
z2 (α) − z1∗ (α)
z1∗ (α+ϵ)

We thank a referee for directing us to address this question.
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Z

z2∗ (α+ϵ)

W (z)dz,
z2∗ (α)

.

and
1
1
W (α + ϵ) − W (α)
<
∗
ϵ
ϵ z2 (α) − z1∗ (α)

Z

z1∗ (α)

Z
W (z)dz +

z1∗ (α+ϵ)

!

z2∗ (α+ϵ)

W (z)dz

.

(2)

z2∗ (α)
′

p
Consequently, when W (α) ̸= W (α + ϵ) ̸= W (zm
), we have W (α) = lim

ϵ−→0

W (α+ϵ)−W (α)
ϵ

< 0, be′

cause the right-hand side of equation (2) tends to zero as ϵ −→ 0. Then, if α ∈ [ 21 , n+1
], W (α) =
2n
′

, 1], W (α) < 0, and the function W is a continuous and non-increasing func0, and if α ∈ ( n+1
2n
p
p
tion. Given that for any α ∈ [ 21 , n+1
], W (α) = W (zm
), and W (zm
) = max
W (α), we can
2n
1
α∈[ 2 ,1]

conclude that W (α) is maximal for any α ∈

[ 12 , n+1
].
2n

Therefore, for a sufficiently large n, the

majority rule (α = 21 ) is the unique rule that maximizes W .

■

The analysis shows that when Nature chooses the status quo randomly, the majority rule maximizes expected utilitarian welfare. This finding complements studies that have highlighted other
interesting properties of the majority rule; see, e.g., May (1952), and Dasgupta and Maskin
(2008). We find another interesting property of the majority rule among the illustrations developed in Section 4. In particular, in Section 4.3, we show that the majority rule is the unique rule
that maximizes political compromise.
4. Illustrations
Having presented Theorems 1, 2, and 3, we now use the results to illustrate policy diversity
across identical political economies. In Section 4.1, we propose an illustration which demonstrates
how two countries with identical political, economic, and cultural preferences over immigration
resettlement could implement different policies.
4.1. Equilibrium Number and Policy Diversity
In this illustration, the political economy P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) represents the government of
a country that is developing a refugee resettlement program to help asylum seekers. We assume
that this decision belongs to the legislators (in N ) who represent the country’s citizens, and the
country derives utility from the number of refugees (z ∈ Z) it admits. The utility can be in terms
of the national and international “warm glow” that it receives, or in terms of the skills or cultural
21

diversity brought by the refugees. We assume that Z =]0, +∞[ and represent a legislator i’s
preference, ⪰i , over Z by a utility function, Vi . In the legislature, the decision is made under the
supermajority rule, Lα . For simplicity, we assume that the net utility received by each legislator i
from z refugees being admitted is Vi (z) = vi ln(z) − nz , where

1
n

is the fraction of the total cost of

refugee admission incurred by each constituency (assuming n constituencies) in the country, and
vi is legislator i’s valuation of the number of refugees. Observe that Vi is single-peaked, and so
voter i’s peak is obtained by solving V ′ (zi ) = 0, leading to the solution zip = nvi . Suppose nine
legislators (n = 9) collectively choose the number of refugees to be admitted following either the
static or the dynamic voting procedure described in Section 3. We assume that Nature randomly
selects a legislator to propose a policy to the legislature. Using Theorems 1 and 3, the maximum
number of equilibria is



1








3



max |E(P(α))| = 5






7






9

if α ∈ [ 12 , 95 ]
if α ∈ ( 59 , 23 ]
if α ∈ ( 23 , 79 ] .
if α ∈ ( 79 , 89 ]
if α ∈ ( 89 , 1]

We assume that vi = i, where i = 1, 2, ..., 9. Then, the legislators’ peaks are: z1p = 9, z2p = 18,
z3p = 27, z4p = 36, z5p = 45, z6p = 54, z7p = 63, z8p = 72, and z9p = 81. The legislator with
valuation vi = 5 is the median voter. The peak z5p = z1∗ ( 21 ) = z2∗ ( 12 ) = 45 defeats all other peaks
in a pairwise majoritarian election (α = 12 ), and becomes the only peak which is not defeated.
Therefore, under the majority rule, the country grants permanent residency to 45 refugees.
Now, suppose that the legislators choose the number of refugees using a two-thirds supermajority
rule (α =

2
).
3

Any proposal in the set {27, 36, 45, 54, 63} cannot be defeated in a pairwise

supermajoritarian election, because all alternatives will fail to win support from the necessary
supermajoritarian coalition. These proposals are shielded from the possibility of amendment on
the legislative floor. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 2, any outcome in the set {9, 18, 72, 81}
can be defeated by either z1∗ ( 32 ) = 27 or z2∗ ( 23 ) = 63. It follows that two different countries that
are identical in terms of the number of legislators, legislators’ preferences, and voting rule are likely
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f (z ′ ) > 0

Number of voters

8

f (z ′ ) + 32 n
g(z ′ ) + 32 n

g(z ′ ) > 0

6
αn =

2
3

×9

4

2

9

18

z1∗

Equilibria

z2∗

27

36 45 54
Policy z ′

63

72

81

Figure 2: Equilibrium Range for refugee resettlement program when α = 2/3.
pointsP
are those
P Note: Equilibrium
between z1∗ ( 23 ) = 27 and z2∗ ( 23 ) = 63 inclusive. For all z ′ , f (z ′ ) + 32 n =
S(z) and g(z ′ ) + 32 n =
S(z).
z≥Z z ′

z ′ ≥Z z

to diverge in policy choice under the two-thirds supermajority rule. For example, depending on
the random voter that is chosen to make a proposal, one country may grant permanent residency
to only 27 refugees while the other may grant this privilege to 54 refugees. Under majority rule,
both countries will converge in their policy, and will grant permanent residency to 45 refugees.16
4.2. Provision of Public Goods: Social Optimum and Equilibrium
In this section, the political economy P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) represents a community, N , in
which agents must decide the level of provision of a public, z ∈ Z, in a pairwise political contest
following the supermajority rule, Lα , and a voting procedure described in Section 3. For simplicity,
16

Beyond explaining policy developments in international negotiations, our findings are also validated by McGrath et al. (2018), who conducted a comparative study across U.S. states. Leveraging cross-country variation in
state legislative override requirements, they find that legislatures with higher override requirements demonstrate
less ability to override an executive veto. Mapping the legislative process to our model, state governors first
propose budgets and then legislatures pass their own. The budget is then sent to the governor for approval and,
if vetoed, can only be enacted if a legislative supermajority overrides the veto. The supermajority thresholds used
in the study — which, in this case, are the proportions of the legislature needed to override an executive veto —
vary between 12 and 23 . (Note, however, that three U.S. states with a 35 or majority veto override were excluded
from some models because they also had supermajority budgetary requirements (McGrath et al., 2018, p. 165).)
In accordance with our results, budgets passed in U.S. states with higher override requirements were substantially closer to those proposed by the governor, with the strongest effects in states where executives’ preferences
diverged sharply from those of legislative veto players.
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we assume that Z is one-dimensional. As in Section 4.1, we represent agent i’s preference ⪰i
over Z by a utility function, Vi . The current level of the public good is z, and agents vote to
increase or decrease it. A voting equilibrium z ∗ is any amount of public good that belongs to the
equilibrium set E(P(α)). An outcome ze is a social optimum (or an efficient provision of the
P
public good) if ze ∈ arg max W (z), where W (z) =
Vi (z) is the social welfare at z.
z∈Z

i∈N

Does there exist a supermajority rule Lα that guarantees the social optimum ze ∈ E(P(α))?
What is the minimal α among such rules? To address these questions, we first show that the
social optimum outcome belongs to the range [zmin , zmax ] (see Figure 3).
Range which includes ze
zmin

z1∗

z2∗

zmax

Equilibria
Figure 3: The social optimum and voting equilibrium.

By contradiction, assume that zmin > ze . Then, in a pairwise opposition between ze and zmin ,
the former receives zero share of the votes, meaning that each agent prefers zmin to ze , or
Vi (zmin ) > Vi (ze ), ∀i ∈ N . The latter expression leads to W (zmin ) > W (ze ), which is absurd
by the definition of ze . We obtain the same conclusion if we assume that ze > zmax . If the
decision is made by using the unanimity rule (α = 1), then the social optimum ze ∈ E(P(1)),
because there will never be enough agents who can form a winning coalition to defeat ze in a
pairwise political competition. Assume that Nature chooses the status quo, and the minimum
size of the majority required to pass a decision is less than the size of all voters (unanimity rule),
then the social optimum could be an equilibrium. Moreover, our findings suggest that the size of
the equilibrium set increases as the size of the majority required to pass social decision increases.
Then, depending on agents’ preferences, there always exists a minimum threshold αmin ∈ [ 12 , 1],
such that ze ∈ E(P(αmin )). However, if Nature chooses randomly a proposer, and the social
optimum does not coincide with any ideal policy closer to the proposer’s peak, then it will not
have a chance to be submitted for a vote whatever the threshold required by the supermajority
rule. For that reason, there will not exist a majority threshold α under which the social optimum,
ze , is undefeated in our political competition models.
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For the sake of illustration and using the numerical example in Section 4.1, suppose that |N | = 5,
and an agent i’s net utility takes the form: Vi (z) = vi ln z− z5 , where the factor vi represents agent
i’s valuation or taste for the public good. If an outcome z emerges as the voting equilibrium,
each agent will pay a fraction

1
5

of the additional cost. It is straightforward to show that Vi is

single-peaked. Agents’ peaks are the sequence (zip ) such that: zip = 5vi , where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
5
P
The social welfare at each alternative z is given by W (z) =
vi ln z − z, so that the efficient
i=1

level of public good is ze =
agents’ peaks are z1p = 30,

5
P
i=1
z2p

vi . Arbitrarily taking v1 = 6, v2 = 2, v3 = 3, v4 = 4 and v5 = 8,
= 10, z3p = 15, z4p = 20 and z5p = 40, and the social optimum

ze is 23, with W (ze ) = 49.11637. The voting equilibrium level of the public good depends on
the size of majority required to pass the decision. Using Theorems 2 and 3, and assuming that
Nature randomly chooses the status quo, the equilibrium set is E(P(α)) = [z1∗ (α), z2∗ (α)], where
the bounds z1∗ (α) and z1∗ (α) depend on the supermajority rule α. Under any supermajority rule
p
α ∈ [ 12 , 53 ], for instance, we observe that z4p = zm
, the median peak, defeats any other agent’s

peak in a pairwise political contest and so the only voting equilibrium is z4p . However, the social
optimum ze is not a voting equilibrium, because ze ̸= z4p . Nevertheless, for any supermajority
α ∈ ( 35 , 54 ], the equilibrium range is given by the interval [z3p = 15, z1p = 30], including the social
optimum ze = 23. Similarly, when α ∈ ( 45 , 1], the equilibrium set is [z2p = 10, z5p = 40], which
also includes ze . It follows that the minimal supermajority rule that guarantees ze in E(P(αmin ))
is αmin = 53 . Evaluating expected utilitarian welfare, it holds that




W (z4p ) ≊ 48.90184
if α ∈ [ 12 , 35 ]



R
W (α) = 1 30 (23 ln z − z)dz ≊ 48.6699 if α ∈ ( 3 , 4 ] .
15 15
5 5




R

 1 40 (23 ln z − z)dz ≊ 47.47248 if α ∈ ( 4 , 1]
30 10
5

(3)

Using the system in (3), we note that for any supermajority α ∈ [ 12 , 35 ], W (α) is maximal, and
W (α) = W (z4p ).
max
1

α∈[ 2 ,1]

4.3. Political Compromise
Successful reforms in polarizing policy domains — gun control, abortion, healthcare and immigration among others — requires legislators to make mutual sacrifices and willfully compromise
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their core values and principles, or interests. Today, growing cleavages between parties in many
developed and democratic countries have hampered political compromise, as those at the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum find policy near the median voter’s ideal point increasingly
unappealing.17 In this illustration, we do not seek to provide the sources of political compromise
in democratic settings, but rather to rationalize political compromise that is observed in democratic legislatures. Let P(α) = (N, Z, (⪰i ), Lα ) be a political economy, and assume that Z is
endowed with the order topology induced by the total order ≥Z , and we denote by d, a distance
defined on Z. We assume that Nature randomly chooses a proposer i to make a proposal, and
let zip be the ideal policy of i. The level of political compromise of proposer i is the distance
pci defined as: pci (α) =

min {d(z, zip )}.

z∈E(P(α))

In fact, a proposer i will propose their ideal point zip only if it is an equilibrium point; if their ideal
point is not an equilibrium, they will propose the closest equilibrium point to their ideal point; this
is because proposing their ideal point will result in a defeat. The level of political compromise for
an agent i is therefore the distance between their ideal point and the closest equilibrium point.
For principled politicians whose ideological platforms are located either to the left of equilibrium
z1∗ (α) or to the right of equilibrium z2∗ (α), Figure 4 illustrates the necessary compromise they
must make, as the incumbents, to avoid defeat in all pairwise supermajoritarian political contests.
Equilibria
zmin

z

z1∗ (α)

z2∗ (α)

compromise

z′

zmax

compromise

Figure 4: Political compromise.

A political party with ideal policy (or fundamental ideological identity) “z” must compromise
by moving toward the closest equilibrium to its political platform to avoid defeat in a pairwise
17
Gutmann and Thompson (2010) attribute the success of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in the United States
Congress to successful bipartisan compromise and the passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, and the 2010 Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act to mutual sacrifice and mutual opposition by Democratic and Republican
leadership. Additionally, a 2019 survey by the Pew Research Center finds that most U.S. adults support more
political compromise and respect toward opposing political views from opposing political parties (Pew Research
Center, 2019).
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election against z2∗ (α). It is rational, then, for this party to run on platform z1∗ (α) if it enters in
the race. The same strategy applies to the politician with ideal point z ′ , who must compromise
by running on z2∗ (α). Compromising, then, is rational, as it increases the likelihood of challenging
the status quo in a pairwise supermajoritarian election. Indeed, for a given proposer i, the optimal
amount of compromise is the minimal distance between i’s ideal policy to the equilibrium point
that maximizes i’s preferences. Given that preferences are single-peaked, the minimal distance is
obtained from the closest equilibrium policy to i’s ideal point. Our findings in Theorems 1, 2, and
3 show that the size of the equilibrium set varies increasingly as the size of majority α required by
the decision rule increases. This reduces the distances of political ideologies to possible equilibria,
and therefore diminishes the level of political compromise, pci (α), for each proposer i as the size α
n
P
increases. Therefore, if pc(α) = n1
pci (α) represents the average level of political compromise
i=1

in the political economy P(α), then, we can show that pc is maximal under majority rule. In other
words, the majority rule is the unique that maximizes political compromise in a supermajoritarian
political economy.
5. Conclusion and Remarks
In this study, we derive the minimum and the maximum number of equilibrium policies in static
and dynamic political games under supermajority rules when agents have single-peaked preferences
over a totally ordered policy space. Voters’ strategic behavior is captured by the core (Black,
1948; Downs, 1957) in static environments, and by the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994) in
dynamic environments. We fully characterize the relationship between these numbers and a voting
body’s supermajority rule, showing that the minimum number is one regardless of the rule, and the
maximum number increases in a nontrivial manner in the size of the supermajority coalition needed
to change policy. The well-known Median Voter Theorem, which predicts party convergence to
the median voter’s ideal policy, is a particular case of our results. Our findings can explain why
highly divergent policies may persist, even across democracies with identical political preferences
and voting rules. Policy divergence increases as we move further from majority rule. Moreover,
in deriving the minimum and the maximum number of equilibrium policies in a supermajoritarian
setting, our results translates Duverger’s propositions on institutions and political parties. In only
imposing the assumption that voters hold single-peaked preferences over a totally ordered policy
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space, our model is quite general and applies to a variety of policies beyond those chosen from a
unidimensional set.
Our theory generalizes voting dynamics in other theoretical work (e.g., Dixit et al. (2000)),
and its implications align with voting behavior in institutions ranging from state legislatures
(e.g., McGrath et al. (2018)) to international institutions (e.g., (Stone, 2009)). Additionally,
we contribute to existing social choice literature. Focusing on supermajority voting rules —
a topic that has, to date, received limited attention — the article raises and answers novel
questions. What, precisely, is the relationship between supermajority thresholds and the number
of equilibrium policies? And how does this relationship manifest in the diversity of policies across
institutions with one threshold as opposed to another? Which rules maximize utilitarian welfare?
Which rules maximize political compromise?
Our model also offers avenues for future empirical and theoretical research. Further extensions
can consider proposal or amendment costs that vary based on legislators’ ideal points or on the
location of the proposed policy or amendment. The model is also amenable to accommodating
“decision-costs” from policy gridlock (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) and to introducing uncertainty in legislators’ policy preferences. The latter extension would draw connections between
policy diversity and the extensive literature examining the Condorcet Jury Theorem.18
Empirically, the model offers several testable predictions. Do reductions in amendment thresholds
— such as revisions to the United States Senate requirements to invoke cloture, decrease policy
diversity and increase the extent to which proposers (or political parties) compromise? And,
comparing legislative bodies whose members have similar preferences, do those requiring high
supermajoritarian thresholds to amend proposals generate more diverse policies than those with
low thresholds? And how does the distribution of agenda power mediate the relationship between
policy diversity and voting rules? Despite the challenges in finding variation in voting rules across
otherwise comparable legislative bodies (Cameron, 2009), recent research has employed innovative
data to discern such relationships, both globally and domestically; see, e.g., Blake and Payton
(2015), McGrath et al. (2018), and Brutger and Li (2019).
18

The question of choosing the optimal system considering uncertainty was first formulated by Condorcet
(1793). Also, see Nitzan and Paroush (2017) for further details and extensions.
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